

#### Cyber DEfense Technology Experimental Research (DETER) Network Evaluation Methods for Internet Security Technology (EMIST)

USC Information Sciences Institute • University of California, Berkeley • University of California, Davis • Penn State University Purdue University • International Computer Science Institute • Stanford Research Institute (SRI) • Network Associates • SPARTA

# Routing Data the PREDICT Anonymization Panel

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
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#### Route View Data





#### What data?

· Replay and "Interactive" Replay



# DETER/EMIST Routing Experiments


#### Experiment Information (routing/big-vpn)

'zhang' Logged in. Sun Jun 06 10:31pm PDT

#### Experiment routing/big-vpn

#### **Experiment Options**

View Activity Logfile
Visualization and NS File
Download NS File
Swap Experiment In
Terminate Experiment
Modify Experiment
Edit Experiment Metadata
Reboot All Nodes




**Show History** 

Name:	big-vpn
Long Name:	big routing with UCD-VPN
Project:	routing
Group:	routing
Experiment Head:	zhang
Created:	2004-06-03 19:55:34
Last Swap/Modify:	2004-06-04 20:58:08 (zhang)
Idle-Swap:	Yes (after 4 hours)
Max. Duration:	No
Path:	/proj/routing/exp/big-vpn
Status:	swapped
Minumum Nodes:	28 (estimate)
Mem Usage Est:	0
CPU Usage Est:	3
Sync Server:	CAS1BR1





### Routing Experimentation






#### What data?

· Replay and "Interactive" Replay

- A Sample of Examples:
  - Intra-AS topology and policy configuration
  - Router specific information
    - Dampening implementation
    - · MRAI timer



# Different Dampening Implementations



**SSFNet** 

Zebra

Cisco



### Data Anonymization

- · Property-Oriented Transformation
  - Interesting/hidden properties
  - Consistent transformation
- · The Issue:
  - Correct Transformation → Well-known
     Properties
  - Unknown properties are our main interest



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 "cover-up" for operational mistakes or something along the line ...



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behavior.

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- "cover-up" for operational mistakes or something along the line ...
- "valuable" information for critical infrastructure attackers

The public routing data (e.g., route view)
might be sufficient for the attackers
already, but is still insufficient for clearly
understanding the Internet routing
Newport Beach, California